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GAPS FOR GOD?
Willem B. Drees
Chaotic and complex processes are as much a pan of natural reality as linear
and simple processes. Theories of chaotic and complex systems have made clear,
even more than before, that a naturalistic explanation may be available even in the
absence of predictability. In this sense, they result in a shift in our understanding
of 'understanding.' Theories of complex systems have, by the explanations they
offer and the shift in the concept of explanation, closed gaps in our understanding
of nature. Thereby they have enhanced the strength of a naturalistic view of reality.
The first section will develop this in a discussion of John Polkinghome's
understanding of the unpredictability of natural processes as a locus for divine
action in the world. The second section will give a more general discussion of
'explanation' as understood in contemporary philosophy of science. One might
discern two conceptions of explanation in contemporary philosophy of science.
Oinic views of explanation consider an event explained if it is understood as a
possible consequence of a causal mechanism. Epistemic views of explanation
consider phenomena and laws explained if they are seen as part of a wider
framework. Chaotic processes can be considered explained, or explainable, within
each of these conceptions of explanation. Thus, this more general argument
supports the conclusion that a quest for gaps in chaotic or complex processes is
misguided.
Denying such gaps within natural processes does not foreclose all options for
a religious view of reality, as the framework does not explain the framework itself
(upon an epistemic view of explanation) and the mechanisms do not explain the
mechanisms (upon an ontic view of explanation). Thus, questions about the whole
and about the most fundamental structures of reality are not excluded. One way of
developing such an argument of a more general nature, focusing on the world as
a whole, is Arthur Peacocke's model for particular divine action via "top-down
causation." Some weaknesses in this position will be pointed out in the third
section. Hence, rather than seek to understand God's action in the world, we might
attempt to envisage the world as God's action. Limit questions about reality are
persistent. Discussions about religion in relation to the whole of reality (cosmol-
ogy) and to the most fundamental structures of reality (e.g., quantum physics), as
well as discussions about the nature of scientific and religious knowledge (which,
in different ways, seek to acquire a view of the world from a point within the
world), are much more credible than a quest for gaps in the chaotic and complex.
Even if complex phenomena within reality are understood naturalistic-ally, the
world as such is not thereby explained. Hence, there remains room for a sense of
wonder and gratitude. The world may still be seen as dependent upon some source
which transcends the world.
Before embarking on the critical discussion of the proposals by Polkinghome
(section 1) and Peacocke (section 3), I wish to say that I focus on these authors
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because I think their approaches are good examples of their kind and deserve a
significant role in subsequent discussions. I will emphasize those aspects where I
perceive problems rather than the many aspects which I admire and appreciate.
A second preliminary remark: I will not distinguish in detail between chaotic
processes and processes of self-organization, though in the first and second
sections the focus will be on limited predictability (which some take as a sign of
openness), whereas in the third section the focus will be on the appearance of order
(which some take as a sign of a "self," or even of "intentionality").
A third, more fundamental preliminary remark: Arguments are shaped by
assumptions and by the audience one has in mind. This essay is primarily written
with an audience of people like myself in mind: those who takes science seriously
and who hold that there is power (for better and for worse) in religious traditions
and symbols, but who are not easily persuaded by traditional doctrine. On my
view, intellectual investigation in our time has to take the sciences very seriously,
and thus has to favor them over other alleged sources of knowledge, whether
astrology, common sense folk wisdom, or religious traditions, including the
Christian tradition. Otherwise, such investigation runs the risk of demanding "less
than it could of theologians and more than it should of scientists."1 The burden is
on theology rather than on science. As Peacocke has put it, the retreat to conserva-
tive positions is "a sign not so much of a recovery of faith as of a loss of nerve
before the onslaught of new perceptions of the world."2 With Gerd Theissen, I am
convinced that only by deeply immersing ourselves in science, rather than stopping
short of the innermost sanctuaries, the tradition may show up in a new light.'
11'olkinghorne's Defense of Divine Action in the Openness of Processes
Theories regarding chaotic behavior introduce an openness into our description of
the natural world which has been missing from classical Newtonian physics so far.
'L.B. Eaves, "Adequacy or Orthodoxy? Choosing Sides at the Frontier," Zygon 26
(1991): 496. Thus I deviate ftom William Stoeger (see his article, "Describing God's Action
in the World in the Light of Scientific Knowledge of Reality" [in this volume]). At the
conference he took the position that we should start from presuppositions which favor
neither the sciences nor religion. This seems to me to assume more equality and neutrality
than is warranted. Unlike Stoeger, I do not consider as neutral presuppositions the existence
of an active God and the reliability of knowledge provided by the sources of religious
knowledge, such as scripture, tradition, and experience. In giving primacy to the sciences
in intellectual matters, I also deviate from contributions which employ highly theological
language.
'Arthur R. Peacocke, Theology fora Scientific Age : Being and Becoming—Natural
and Divine (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), ix.
'Gerd Theissen, Biblical Faith: An Evolutionary Approach (London: SCM Press,
1984), xi.
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This openness would be a kind of "local contingency"* which might allow for
human or divine free will and human or divine agency. This view has been
eloquently defended by Anglican priest and theoretical physicist John Polking-
norne.
In a bottom-up description of the physical world, the onset of flexible
openness is signaled by the myriad possibilities of future development which
present themselves to a complex dynamical system. In a quasi-deterministic
account they arise from the greatly differing trajectories which would result from
initial conditions differing only infinitesimaUy from one another. Because of their
undiffercmiable proximity of circumstance, there is no energetic discrimination
between these possibilities. The "choice" of the path actually followed corresponds
not to the result of some physically causal act (in the sense of an energy input) but
rather to a "selection" from options (in the sense of an information input).
It is by no means clear that information input of the kind described
originates solely from animals, humankind, and whatever similar agents
there might be. I do not believe that God is contained within the mind/
matter confines of the world, but it is entirely conceivable that he might
interact with it (both in relation to humanity and in relation to all other open
process) in the form of information input ... God is not pictured as an
interfering agent among other agencies. (That would correspond to energy
input.) Instead, form is given to the possibility that he influences his
creation in a non-energetic way.'
The laws of nature allow for gaps where one might envisage divine and/or
human action. Central to this argument is the possibility of information input
without energy input, thus without interfering with physical laws regarding energy.
I question this line of argument for several reasons, especially insofar as it
appeals to chaos theories and the like. Even if there is no difference in energy
between two states, energy might still be needed to change the system from one
definite state to another. This energy is taken from the background (with its non-
zero temperature acting as a source of energy fluctuations), but it is not a choice
made by the system itself. Self-organization should perhaps be more properly
named "hetero-organization," organization triggered by the immediate environ-
ment. In a sense Polkinghome grants this when he speaks about information input,
which sounds like external determination rather than self-organization, though he
also uses the argument to argue for human self-determination.
'Sec Roben John Russell, 'Contingency in Physics and Cosmology: A Critique of the
Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg," Zygon 23, no. 1 (March 1988), foi a definition of "local
contingency."
'John C. Polkinghome, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and
Theology (London: SPCK Press, 1991). 45. See also idem, 'The Laws of Nature and the
Laws of Physics" in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives
on Divine Action, ed. Roben John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C J. Isham (Vatican City
State: Vatican Observatory, 1993; and Berkeley. CA: Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences, 1993), 437-48.
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Polkinghome's argument is based upon the possibility that there is a
significant difference in output, even though there is no energy difference in the
input. Take, for instance, two different mental acts corresponding to a choice
between two options. We experience them as different in information content, not
(qua mental acts) as physically different in energy or labor involved. However, that
may well be an illusion, due to the enormous ampliilcatory powers of the central
nervous system.' Theories on chaos and self-organization show just this, that
amplificatory powers of physical systems with respect to small initial differences
are much more impressive than was previously thought. One should avoid
confusing zero and close to zero in this context; it is essential to Polkinghorne's
position that the energy input is absolutely zero rather than almost infinitesimally
close to zero, as in the case of low energy events acting as switches modulating
processes which expend larger, observable amounts of energy.
In Science and Providence Polkinghome takes the example of a bead at the
top of an inverted U-shaped wire. In this case, he argues, there would be no energy
barrier between the options of moving the bead to the left or to the right; God
could act without input of energy.7 An objection to this claim is that if God were
to act without input of energy, God's action would have to be infinitely slow.
Technically speaking, a basic rule of quantum mechanics is AE-At 2 lifl (just like
the better known uncertainty relation for position and momentum). Hence, if the
energy is to become zero, the time will have to extend to infinity. However,
infinitely slow action is ruled out, as the decisive input of information should take
place before energetic disturbances have changed the situation.'
The relation between providing information and spending energy can also be
argued more positively. Information which is embodied physically through two (or
more) distinct states, representing 0 and 1, requires a minimal energy-difference
to write or read. This is a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics. The
relevant inequality' is AI j; AE/kBT In2, which is equivalent to AE 2 AI-k8T In2.
There seems to be no basis in physics for the claim that there is transfer of
information without transfer of energy. Invoking quantum physics to provide the
missing premise is problematic. Working with a mixture of classical and quantum
physics, eclectically invoking the one which fits best at any specific stage of the
'Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wonting
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 77-78.
'Polkinghome, Science and Providence: Cod's Interaction with the World (Boston:
Shambhala, 1989). 32.
"George F.R. Ellis suggests in his essay "Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action:
The Nexus of Intervention," (in this volume) that intervention without energy can take place
by controlling the timing of quantum events, say the decay of an excited atom. This seems
to violate the same Heisenberg uncertainty relation between energy and time at the other
end: controlling the timing precisely would imply a major indeterminacy in energy.
*Leon BriUouin, Science and Information Theory, 2d. ed. (New York: Academy Press,
1962), 681; see also John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anlhropic Cosmological
Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 661.
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argument, may be acceptable in a pragmatic context; however, it is methodologi-
cally unsatisfactorily once one aims at more fundamental, metaphysical claims.
Once one understands the world as a quantum world throughout, one has to deal
with the question whether there is a similar divergence of trajectories in the
quantum world as there is in the classical world of chaos. I am not capable of
judging that issue but. as far as I am aware of the technical literature on "quantum
chaos," the question has been answered in the negative.
Polkinghome is cautious about quantum chaos. He offers another argument
for ontologies! openness:
[I]f apparently open behavior is associated with underlying apparently
deterministic equations, which is to be taken to have greater ontological
seriousness—the behavior or the equations?10
This preference for the phenomena (unpredictability) rather than the current
explanation (deterministic chaos) is problematic, at least given Polkinghorne's
defense of critical realism. Defenses of critical realism argue from explanatory
power to ontology, that is, to the reality of the theoretical entities postulated in the
explanation. In this sense, "epistemology models ontology," as Polkinghorne
affirms and which he interprets as "acquired knowledge is a guide to the way
things are."" The disagreement is as to what constitutes the "epistemology," or the
"acquired knowledge," which the convictions about the underlying entities and
processes have to follow. Polkinghome seems to assume that the "epistemology"
which is to be followed is the limited predictability (which he sees as an indication
of ontological openness). However, the epistemology is much richer than the
observation of limited predictability. The epistemology includes the theory which
explains that unpredictability and the processes by means of non-linear, determin-
istic equations. In that sense, a comparison with the analysis of quantum
uncertainty is mistaken, as there the theory allows, at least on some major
interpretations, the conclusion of "genuine indeterminacy."11 Polkinghome prefers
to interpret unpredictability as a sign of ontological openness, bypassing the
(deterministic) explanatory theory available. Sticking to the phenomena and
discarding the available explanation is not a critical realist strategy, but an
empiricist one.
The move from a deterministic theory to ontological openness is also
problematic in relation to the science at hand: there is no new principle involved
in chaotic systems. There are, of course, new discoveries of order in and through
chaos. And the iteration characteristic of self-organizing systems—that the
outcome of one stage, say a living organism, is itself the starting point of the next
stage—enriches our understanding of the historicity of nature.13 Still, the scientific
'"Polkinghorne. Reason and Reality, 41.
"Polkinghome, "Laws of Nature," 440.
"Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality, 42; and idem."Laws of Nature," 440.
"See Bernd-Olaf Klippers. "Understanding Complexity" (in this volume); and idem,
"On a Fundamental Paradigm Shift in the Natural Sciences," in Selforganizalioit: Portrait
of a Scientific Revolution, cd. Wolfgang Krohn, Gunter Kuppes, and Helga Nowotny
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study of self-organizing, complex, and chaotic systems has not revealed new gaps
to be filled by some external actor. Although complex systems exhibit behavior as
if they were guided by an external organizing principle or an intentional self, the
theories show that such behavior is explainable without invoking any such
actor—whether a self, a life force, or a divine Informator. As such, chaos theory
is the extension of the bottom-up program to complex systems rather than a
suggestion of the existence of some "top" from which "intentional causation" as
"information" proceeds downwards.
Polkinghome acknowledges that the use of openness as the causal joint
between God and the world seems like a "Gud-of-the-gaps" strategy, even though
God is not competing as "an alternative source of energetic causation." However,
Polkinghome argues that there is a fundamental difference between these gaps and
earlier gaps, which "were epistemic, and thus extrinsic to nature, mere patches of
current scientific ignorance."11 do agree that there is a fundamental difference, but
it works in the other direction. Whereas in the case of epistemic gaps reflecting
ignorance one might maintain an agnostic stance with respect to the possibility of
a regular scientific explanation, with the advent of chaos theories there is no reason
for such an open attitude. Though there is unpredictability, there is also an
underlying theory. To claim gaps is not merely to remain agnostic where we do not
know, but to go against what is currently taken as knowledge—the unpredictability
of systems which are described by deterministic equations. At this level, we are not
confronted with any indications of "gaps" in the processes, unlike the situation at
the quantum level and at the cosmological level.
The newly won scientific insights regarding complexity change our view of
the world. Unpredictability is, of course, very relevant beyond the strictly scientific
context, especially in the context of ethics. To what extent are we responsible if we
have only a limited view of the consequences of our actions? For instance, limited
predictability and the instability of systems is very relevant in assessing the risks
of a Jurassic Park. But it does not offer or undergird a specific view of divine
action in individual events or of a causal joint between God and the world.
Unpredictability is metaphysically uninteresting, at most a necessary but
insufficient condition for metaphysical openness. Peacocke's alternative intends
to avoid the interventionistic approach of seeking gaps as specific causal joints. He
envisages God's interaction with the world as a whole. It is to such ideas that we
will turn below. But before turning to alternatives, I would like to consider briefly
the concept of scientific explanation in relation to arguments about gaps, as it
allows for an additional argument against the attempt considered here to find gaps
for divine action within unpredictable and "self-organizing" processes.
(Boston: Kluwer. 1990), 51-63.
'Polkinghome, "Laws of Nature," 446.
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2 Explanations and Gaps
If there is in reality an openness which allows for divine action (see Polkinghome' s
position in the preceding section), there should be elements in the processes which
are not explained sufficiently otherwise. Thus, it seems relevant to spend some
time on the notion of explanation as it functions in the context of the sciences.
Explanation is one of several notoriously difficult concepts.1 The "classic"
view is the covering-law model of explanation, which explains an event on the
basis of one or more general laws and one or more conditions.3 On this view, an
explanation is similar in structure to a prediction from initial conditions and a law.
The covering-law model is of limited value, as the notion of laws is more adequate
to the physical sciences than to the other natural sciences. Besides, the connection
between explanation and causation is absent in many cases. For instance, the height
of a flagpole is calculated on the basis of the laws of optics, the position of the Sun
and the length of the shadow—but it is not caused by these.
Given the problems with the covering-law model, contemporary philosophers
have offered other views of explanation. They seek to give accounts of explanation
which incorporate not only predictive power but also some other features which
make for successful explanations and justify the move from explanatory power to
approximate truth. There seem to be two kinds of conceptions of explanation, an
epistemic one and an ontic one. For instance, Philip Kiieher stresses unifying
power' while Richard Boyd emphasizes a realist view of causes. Kitcher's
epistemic approach sets the phenomena in a wider theoretical framework. Boyd
seeks an ontic approach, a quest for the causes or mechanisms involved. Such ontic
and epistemic approaches "are not mutually exclusive, but, rather, complemen-
tary."6
*See Philip Gasper, 'Causation and Explanation," in The Philosophy of Science, ed.
Richard Boyd. Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 289-98;
and Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, eds.. Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989). of which one essay has been «published independ-
ently as Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1989).
t. Hempeland P. Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of
Science 15 (1948): 135-75.
'Kitcher, "Explanatory Unification," Philosophy of Science 48 (1981): 507-31;
reprinted in The Philosophy of Science, éd. Boyd, et al.
*Boyd, "Observations, Explanatory Power, and Simplicity: Toward a Non-Humean
Account," in Observation, Experiment, and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, ed.
Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1985); reprinted in
Philosophy of Science, cd. Boyd, et al. For other views of explanation besides the epistemic
and ontic views considered here see Bas C. van Fraassen's "pragmatic view" (The Scientific
Image [Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1980], 97-157); and Salmon's "modal" conception of
explanation {Four Decades).
'Salmon, Four Decades, x.
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With the distinction between epistemic and ontic views of explanation, we
can now return to our reflections on chaotic processes. These processes existed, of
course, before they were labeled as such. However, with the discovery by E.
Lorenzof a simple set of three equations which showed erratic behavior in 1963,
we enter the era of chaos theory. This theory deals with deterministic equations
governing processes which are extremely sensitive to minute differences in initial
conditions, and which therefore allow only limited predictability.
On an epistemic view of explanation, chaotic processes are explained since
they fit into a wider theoretical framework, parts of which have been around for
centuries (e.g., differential equations), other elements of which were developed
more or less around the same time as chaotic processes were recognized (e.g.,
fractals). Chaos theory has not diminished the unity of explanatory accounts, but
rather has increased it as more phenomena are now treated within the framework
of mathematical physics.
An ontic view of explanation is not so much oriented to the structure of our
knowledge as to the availability of a mechanism which would explain the
phenomena under consideration. With respect to chaotic processes of limited
predictability, such a causal account is readily available. Even though we could not
have predicted a specific storm two weeks in advance, since we were unable to
observe in sufficient detail all the conditions at that moment (e.g., the butterfly
effect), we have no problem envisaging a possible causal mechanism which
resulted in that storm. We cannot predict the numbers that will come up when we
throw a pair of dice. We are unable to predict which way the bead will fall along
an inverse U-shaped wire. But in either case, we can envisage how it may have
come about the way it actually came about (e.g., due to minute influences from the
air, the surface, etc.). Predictability is not a necessary condition for explainability.
We prefer deductive explanations, which tell us that given the conditions and
the laws (or the mechanism, or the framework, or whatever understanding of
explanation is involved), the event was certain to happen. However, we also have
situations where we can say that given the conditions and the laws, it was likely
(say with 0.95 probability) or less likely (say with 0.3 probability) to happen. If a
theory predicts that an event might happen, say with a probability of 0.3, and it
happens, would one say that the theory has explained the event? It certainly
explains the possibility of the event, even though it does not explain its occurrence
on this occasion. This is the situation which we face, for different reasons, in the
case of chaotic processes such as the weather, and in the context of quantum
theories. For the moment, I will restrict the discussion to chaotic processes. There
the problem is not so much due to an intrinsic openness in reality as described by
the laws (as might be the case in quantum physics) but to our limited knowledge
of the actual situation.
With respect to a probabilistic explanation necessitated by such insufficient
knowledge of the conditions I agree with the following summary of an argument
by Richard Jeffrey:
[WJhen a stochastic mechanism—e.g., the tossing of coins or genetic
determination of inherited characteristics—produces a variety of outcomes,
some more probable and others less probable, we understand those with
small probabilities exactly as well as we do those that are highly probable.
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Our understanding results from an understanding of that mechanism and
the fact that it is stochastic.7
Jeffrey's position is expressed within the context of an ontic view of
explanation. On this view, we may well have unpredictability without inexplicabil-
ity, and without an opportunity to postulate openness in the processes involved.
There is a wide range between the explained and an inexplicable event which
would be linked with a genuine "gap" in nature, or in our understanding of nature.
In between are phenomena which could be explainable but are currently
inexplicable as we do not have the correct theory yet—such was the situation with
the discovery of 'ugh temperature" superconductivity in ceramic materials. Even
without an explanation we assume the phenomenon to be explainable in terms of
physics, probably known physics, but otherwise with a modification of known
physics. There may also be phenomena which are explainable but will never be
predictable—as is the case with chaotic processes. As the events will never be fully
predictable, one can never exclude particular divine action hidden in the
unpredictability. However, as I see it, if there is no indication of or need for such
an assumption of openness and divine action, the assumption is not justified.
Quantum uncertainty, such as in the decay of a nucleus, may be of a different kind.
Here we have good grounds to exclude an ordinary cause or "hidden variable," and
thus an explanation of the limited predictability as a consequences of an unob-
served but real physical process. However, even with quantum physics we need to
be cautious, as quantum physics will be modified or replaced, and is open to
various interpretations.
So far, we have not made an explicit distinction between explanations of
particular facts or events and the explanation of laws. However, this distinction is
relevant in this context. Most accounts of explanation, including the traditional
covering-law model, are primarily concerned with the explanation of facts,
assuming a framework (laws, mechanisms, or the like). To some extent, the
framework assumed can be considered as a fact to be explained in a wider
framework—as Ohm's law for electrical currents can be explained in the context
of a more general theory of electromagnetism in combination with some solid state
physics. There are sequences of explanations. Chemists refer to astrophysicists for
the explanation of the existence of elements and to quantum physicists for the
explanation of the bonds between atoms. Somehow, these sequences converge:
various questions about the structure of reality are passed on until they end up on
the desk of fundamental physicists (dealing with quantum field theory, super-
strings, etc.) and questions about the history of reality end up on the desk of the
cosmologist. As an American president is said to have had written on a sign on his
desk: 'The buck stops here." Thus, the physicist and the cosmologist may well say
'Salmon, Four Decades, 62, referring to R.C. Jeffrey, "Statistical Explanation vs.
Statistical Inference," in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher
(Dordrecht Reidel, 1970).
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"Only God knows.'* This particular position of physicists and cosmologists in the
quest for explanation may make it clearer why they get drawn easily into
philosophical and theological disputes in a way foreign to geologists, biologists,
or chemists. It is not the claim that it is an effective, fruitful, or feasible heuristic
strategy to explain all phenomena from "first principles"; calculations and
derivations may be beyond our capacities. The argument is that there are limit
questions concerning the scientific enterprise. These limit questions show up most
clearly in physics and cosmology, and—I would like to add to the example from
Misner and Weinberg—in philosophy of science, since on the desk of the
philosopher of science rest questions about the nature of the explanations and
arguments offered, and the role of human subjects therein.9
The position that all phenomena can be explained in a framework which
would be "incomplete" only with respect to questions about the basic structure and
the whole, is naturalistic. It is well captured in a phrase from the philosophy of
John Dewey: "Mountain peaks do not flow unsupported; they do not even rest
upon the earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations."" Such a
naturalistic view of reality fits well with contemporary science and contemporary
philosophical reflections on the concept of explanation. It is at odds with the quest
for an openness for divine action in complex or chaotic processes. However, such
a naturalistic view does not exclude theological options at other levels. There still
may be speculative theological answers to questions about the framework, the laws
and initial conditions, or whatever is assumed.
Quantum physics is one of the options; this is emphasized by George Ellis,
Nancey Murphy, and Thomas Tracy in this volume. I do agree that this is a more
appropriate level for envisaging divine action than any process at a higher level of
reality. However, I am nonetheless skeptical about the use of quantum physics to
envisage divine action. One reason is that quantum indeterminacy might be
resolved either via a modification of quantum physics or via a different intcrprcia-
*The image of handing questions from one desk to another is taken from C.W. Misner,
'Cosmology and Theology," in Cosmology, History, and Theology, ed. Wolfgang Your grau
and Allen D. Breek (New York: Plenum, 1977). See also Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a
Final Theory (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 242. It may be that the distinction
between structural and historical questions breaks down in quantum cosmology, but that
makes no difference for the argument. On quantum cosmology see CJ. Isham, "Quantum
Theories of the Creation of the Universe," in Quantum Cosmology.
'I only realized after completing this paper that this argument about cosmology,
physics, and philosophy of science is parallel to the conclusion I reached in an earlier
contribution on time in cosmology, where I argued for two options, a Platonic cosmological
one and ». constructivist one. See Willem B. Drees, "A Case Against Temporal Critical
Realism? Consequences of Quantum Cosmology for Theology," in Quantum Cosmology.
'"John Dewey, An as Experience (New York: Minion, Balch & Co., 1934); also
quoted by H. Fink in Free Will and Determinism: Papers from an Interdisciplinary
Research Conference, 1986, ed. Veggo Mortensen and Roben C. Sorensen (Aarhus,
Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1987), 51.
'
GAPS FOR GOD7 233
lion. Another reason is that indeterminacy may be an opportunity for a metaphysi-
cal supplement to physical causes, but, in my opinion, it does not require such a
move. There is no need to adhere to a metaphysical principle of sufficient reason,
even though the principle of sufficient reason is a good heuristic notion within any
naturalistic approach. I will leave off with these brief remarks, as quantum physics
will be the topic of a future conference. The next section will consider an attempt
to articulate a notion of divine action at the level of the world as a whole, drawing
on our understanding of processes of self-organization in macroscopic systems.
3 Top-Down Causation as Divine Causation
An alternative to an interventionistic view of God's action within processes in the
world has been presented by Arthur Peacocke in his Theology for a Scientific Age.
It relies on the notion of top-down causation. I will briefly present the idea of top-
down causation and its application in the context of theology, before making some
critical comments.
3.1 Some Examples of Top-Down Causation
There are physical and chemical systems in which we find coordinated behavior
of billions of individual molecules. Chemical clocks and the Benard reaction are
examples of this. The system exhibits a global pattern as long as certain conditions
at the spatial boundary are maintained. Individual molecules behave according to
this global pattern, rather than in the manifold of possible ways described in the
statistics of an ideal gas. As Peacocke formulates it, after describing spatial or
temporal (rhythmic) patterns:
In both these instances, the changes at the micro-level, that of the constitu-
ent units, are what they are because of their incorporation into the system
as a whole, which is exerting specific constraints on its units, making them
behave otherwise than they would do in isolation."
Bernd-Olaf Küppers has on various occasions presented theories of self-
organizing systems as theories regarding "boundary conditions."12 There are spatial
boundary conditions, such as the two plates which set the non-equilibrium which
gives rise to Benard convection. More relevant to our understanding of reality are
DNA molecules, which shape the development of each organism and may be seen
as a kind of initial condition. Boundary conditions are, of course, a traditional
feature in physical descriptions—corresponding to the freedom of the experimenter
to choose a certain experimental set-up. However, in the case of the DNA of
organisms, we do not deal with such almost totally contingent boundary
conditions. The boundary conditions which are initial to one stage are the outcome
"Peacocke, Theology, 53-54.
"See KUppers, "Paradigm Shift"
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of the preceding step, and so on. They are thus the product of a long iterated
sequence that gave rise to organisms with biological complexity.
The relation between mental phenomena and brains is sometimes referred to
as another example of top-down causation. According to Peacocke, top-down
causation would provide a middle ground between an unacceptable Cartesian
dualism of two entities and a physicalist reductionism of mental states to brain
states. As far as I understand the discussion, the notion of top-down causation is
invoked in an attempt to clarify and illuminate the relation between mind and brain,
rather than our understanding of the brain and mind being invoked in order to
explain top-down causation. That is the major reason for caution in appealing to
this example. Another reason may be that a reduction!sue approach, if it includes
the environment-organism interaction and the difference between a first-person
and a third-person account, has a stronger case than is granted by authors who see
the need for top-down causality to explain the mind/brain problem.13 However, that
would lead us into a discussion which far exceeds the scope of the present paper.
3 2 Top-Down Causation as a Model for the God-World Interaction
Peacocke exercises welcome caution in pointing to the inadequacy of all human
models and metaphors regarding God." That, however, does not keep him from
an attempt to think through the model of top-down causation.
In the light of these features of the natural world, might we not properly
regard the world-as-a-whole as a total system so that its general state can
be a "top-down" causative factor in, or constraint upon, what goes on at the
myriad levels that comprise it?"
On this view, divine action could make a difference without violating in any
way the regularities and laws. Besides, the model also envisages how natural
events, including human decisions and actions such as prayer, could contribute to
the state of the whole. This truly would be a model of dialogue between humans
and the divine. There is a further gain in this model:
For these ideas of 'top-down' causation by God cannot be expounded
without relating them to the concept of God as, in some sense, an agent,
least misleadingly described as personal
My suggestion is that a combination of the notion of top-down
causation from the integrated unitive mind/brain state to human bodily
action... with the recognition of the unity of the human mind/brain/body
event... together provide a fruitful clue or model for illuminating how we
might think of God's interaction with the world. ... In this model, God
Accounts of the brain and mind without an appeal to "lop-down'' causation are given
by Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little. Brown & Co., 1991); and John R.
Searle, The Rediscovery of Hie Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1992). See also Scientific
American (September 1992), which is dedicated to the mind/brain question.
"See Peacocke, Theology, 90,167 and 188.
"Ibid, 158 and 159.
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would be regarded as exerting continuously top-down causative influences
on the world-as-a-whole in a way analogous to that whereby we in our
thinking can exert effects on our bodies in a 'top-down' manner."
This is better conceived of in terms of transfer of information than of energy.
The result is more than a general influence on the world: "Initiating divine action
on the state of the world-as-a-whole can on this top-down causative model thereby
influence particular events in the world," without ever being observed as a divine
"intervention."11
Peacocke acknowledges the problem that a transfer of information requires
a transfer of energy at the levels with which we are familiar. However, he locates
it at a peculiar place, at the interface between the world-as-a-whole and God, rather
than within the natural order. "This seems to me to be the ultimate level of the
"causal joint" conundrum, for it involves the very nature of the divine being in
relation to that of matter/energy and seems to me to be the right place to locate the
problem.""
33 Cod as the Top in Top-Down Causation?
The issue of energy and information has already been considered above. Here, I
will consider the application of the notion of top-down causation to the world-as-a-
whole.
The example of the Benard cell is a clear instance where the conditions at the
boundary determine the behavior of billions of individual molecules. However, this
is also an example where one could replace the term "top-down causation" by
"environment-system interaction." That environment which sets the temperature
at the boundary plates is a physical system, just as is the system in which the
Benard cells occur. There is nothing peculiarly global about the experiment; all
influences can be traced to local phenomena within the space-time framework. For
instance, setting the boundary conditions has no immediate impact on the behavior
of molecules at some distance from the boundary; it takes some time to settle into
the coordinated state. In the case of DNA the relations are also traceable as local
relations within the spacetime framework. The DNA shapes the development of an
organism. The environment has an impact on the survival of the organism, the
mutations in its DNA, the shuffle of DNA in sexual reproduction, and so on.
In both instances, there is some sense in which a whole (such as the state at
the boundary-plates, or the DNA) serves as the boundary for the system, while the
next stage of the whole (for instance the DNA of the next generation) is shaped by
the development of the system (the organism) in its environment. However, there
"Ibid., 161.
"Ibid.. 163.
"Ibid., 164.
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is no sense in which the system-as-a-whole has any mysterious causal influence.
All causal influences can be traced to local physical influences within the system
or between the system and its immediate environment. Boundaries are local
phenomena, rather than global states of the system-as-a-whole.
In talcing top-down causation as the point of departure for describing the
relation between God and particular events, there is a significant extrapolation from
particular environments to the encompassing notion of "the world-as-a-whole."
God is introduced as the one who sets the boundary conditions for the world-as-a-
whole at the global level. This seems to me to be problematic, if not to say
unwarranted, with respect to the sciences at hand. In the examples which led to the
notion of top-down causation, there is always an important role for the physical
environment One could say that in the example of the Benard cells it is the
environment which acts as the "top," setting the temperature at the plates and
thereby the state of the system. And in the DNA example, it is the preceding
history which has resulted in the DNA that serves as the boundary condition for
the organism that is to develop. When we start talking about "the world-as-a-
whole" then the notion of a global context, of an environment, becomes a
metaphor. In science, we always deal with a context which is also captured in terms
of the same laws of physics. This is, it seems to me, an instance of the distinction
between relative information, as it arises in the scientific context, and absolute
notions with roots in an idealist philosophy and which keep cropping up in
theological use of the science at hand."
The problem is not only the presence of absolute notions, but the idea that in
the natural realm there can be activity proceeding from such absolutes. With
Peacocke I agree that this may be a more appropriate location for "the causal
nexus" than any place within the world of natural processes. However, as a quest
for an understanding of a causal nexus between the divine and the world it still
interferes with any (assumed) completeness of the natural account A promising
alternative which avoids such interference is the reflection upon the natural account
itself, and especially the themes of the existence, order, and intelligibility of the
world.* Rather than seeking an understanding of divine action in the world, the
world itself is understood as God's action. Whatever strength scientific explana-
tions have, there always remain limit questions about reality and about understand-
"I owe this distinction to KUppers, during a preparatory meeling in Castel Gandolfo
in December 1992. The same problematic move from a relative to an absolute lies behind
the distinction between "the future as present," as belonging to the realm of physics, and "the
future as future," as the domain of theology, a move which is important for some German
and Swiss Prolestant authors on theology and science. See A.M. Klaus Müller, Die
präparierte Zeit (Stuttgart, Germany: Radius Verlag, 1972); and C. Link, Schöpfung:
Schöpfiaigitheologie angesichts der Herausforderungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, Handbuch
systematischer Theologie, Bd. 7/2 (GUtersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1991), 444.
'"See Michael Heller. "Chaos, Probability, and the Comprehensibility of the World"
(in this volume).
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ing. These may evoke an attitude of wonder and gratitude. Even when phenomena
within the world are understandable in a naturalistic way, the world as thus
understood may be interpreted from a religious perspective as dependent upon, or
created by, a transcendent source.21
"This will be developed further in W.B. Drees, Mountain Peaks Do Not Flow
Unsupported: A Naturalist View of Religion and a Religious View of Naturalism
(forthcoming, working title). One of the elements in the articulation of a combination of a
naturalist view of religion and a religious view of naturalism is the need to differentiate
between scientific realism and theological realism; neither does the one build upon the other
in the way models in the sciences build upon each other, nor is theological realism defensible
along the «une lines as defenses of scientific realism.
